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59 
AN INTEREST IN THE IMPOSSIBLE 
TODD KESSELMAN

 
I 
Ever since Kant first introduced the notion of disinterested pleasure in 
his Kritik der Urteilskraft from 1790, critics have been baffled by the 
contradictory resonance of the term. Nietzsche, for example, was 
notoriously unsympathetic to Kant‘s aesthetic endeavor, since he took 
Kant to be arguing for a notion of detached and indifferent contemplation 
and concluded from this that Kant‘s theory allowed no room for a robust 
affective engagement with works of art. The idea of pleasure deprived of 
all interest, for Nietzsche, was all but unintelligible. A number of notable 
commentators however (e.g., Guyer, Allison, and Zangwill), have sought 
to defend Kant by claiming that this kind of criticism reflects a basic 
misunderstanding of his terminology.
1
  
Allison, for example, argues that disinterested pleasure does not entail 
that we must be indifferent towards beauty or the kinds of objects that we 
find beautiful; disinterest merely excludes interests from playing any 
founding role in an aesthetic judgment.
2
 This view accounts for our 
investment in beauty by treating it as an interest and then taking this 
interest to be external to the judgment of taste. In this case, for 
disinterested aesthetic judgments, it is merely ―the determination of 
aesthetic value that must be independent of interest . . . .‖3 Thus when 
Kant says in section two of the Analytic of the Beautiful that ―[i]n order to 
play the judge in matters of taste, we must not be in the least biased in 
favor of [a] thing‘s existence but must be wholly indifferent about it,‖ this 
does not prevent us from having all sorts of interests in objects of beauty 
outside of aesthetic judgments.
4
  
 
 
  PhD candidate, Department of Philosophy, New School for Social Research. All translations 
from German are by the author unless otherwise identified. 
 1. For another illuminating critique of Nietzsche‘s reading of Kantian disinterest, see Chapter 
15 of 1 MARTIN HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE 107, 107 (David Farrell Krell trans., 1991). 
 2. Allison writes: 
For when all is said and done, we are still left with the simple question of how someone who 
takes pleasure in beauty can be indifferent to the existence of the objects that are the source of 
this pleasure. The short answer is that one cannot be indifferent, but that, appearances to the 
contrary, the disinterestedness thesis does not really require that one be. 
HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT‘S THEORY OF TASTE: A READING OF THE CRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC 
JUDGMENT 94 (2001). 
 3. Id. at 95.  
 4. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 205, at 46 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., 1987) 
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Allison‘s claim, however, does not adequately address the concerns 
raised by what I am calling Nietzschean-styled criticisms, since they rest 
on the premise that pleasure and interest are intrinsically inseparable—to 
find a thing pleasurable is already to take an interest in it. On this view, 
even if we accept that an aesthetic judgment is not concerned with the 
existence of the object being judged, we cannot separate the pleasure that 
arises through the judgment from an interest. This take on pleasure 
expresses a certain intuitive connection between our receiving pleasure 
from a certain activity and our taking an interest in that activity. And from 
this perspective, Kant‘s description of disinterest does appear puzzling. 
How can we make sense of Kant‘s claim that there is a pleasure that is not 
already an interest—a disinterested pleasure—without reducing disinterest 
to indifference? That is, how can disinterested pleasure address 
Nietzsche‘s criticism that Kantian aesthetic judgments are utterly 
disjointed from any kind of affective investment in beauty?  
The debates surrounding disinterested pleasure in the third Critique 
focus on two central claims: first, that our pleasure in the beautiful is 
―devoid of all interests‖ (ohne alles Interesse) and, second, that 
―judgments of taste, of themselves, do not even give rise to any 
interest[s].‖
5
 This second claim is more problematic for commentators 
because it does not even allow for an external relationship between 
aesthetic judgments and interests, as proposed by Allison: an interest in 
the pleasure that arises as a consequence of a pure aesthetic judgment 
would still be prohibited by this view. For this reason, the second claim is 
often dismissed as being an error on Kant‘s part. For example, in his 
seminal article, Disinterestedness and Desire in Kant's Aesthetics, Guyer 
says that it is not only untenable but ―absurd‖ to claim that ―the beauty of 
an object cannot engender a genuine desire or concern for it,‖ since in fact, 
―the beauty of an object is one of the best reasons we could have for taking 
an interest in it . . . .‖
6
 On the contrary—as Guyer argues at first—Kant‘s 
description of aesthetic lingering in section twelve of the Analytic of the
 
 
[hereinafter KANT, JUDGMENT]. Page references, e.g., 205, are to the Akademie edition, with the 
primed numbers referring to volume 20 and the unprimed numbers referring to volume 5 of the 
Akademie edition. The second page number, e.g., 46, refers to the corresponding page in the 1987 
Pluhar edition. 
 5. Id. at 205 n.10, at 46 (―Aber die Geschmackurteile begründen an sich auch gar kein 
Interesse.‖). 
 6. Paul Guyer, Disinterestedness and Desire in Kant’s Aesthetics, 36 J. AESTHETICS & ART 
CRITICISM 449, 450 (1978).  
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Beautiful makes it appear as if disinterested pleasure must lead to a 
subsequent interest: 
Yet [aesthetic pleasure] does have a causality in it, namely, to keep 
[us in] the state of [having] the presentation itself, and [to keep] the 
cognitive powers engaged [in their occupation] without any further 
aim. We linger in our contemplation of the beautiful, because this 
contemplation reinforces and reproduces itself.
7
  
Lingering expresses the idea that the intrinsic causality of the aesthetic 
judging sustains and reproduces itself, such that the presentation is 
maintained and our mind continues to be engaged with it. Since we aim to 
remain in a certain state of pleasurable appreciation subsequent to the 
original appreciation of beauty, it would appear that disinterested pleasure 
necessarily produces an interest. This is because our ongoing attention to 
the presentation seems to entail that the object that is the source of that 
presentation continues to exist. And this would mean that we are interested 
in the (ongoing) existence of the object.
8
  
However, in an interesting reversal Guyer aims to defend Kant‘s claim 
that aesthetic judgments do not directly give rise to interests—at least in 
part—by showing that aesthetic lingering does not properly constitute an 
interest. Since in Guyer‘s view the operative notion of interest in the 
 
 
 7. KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 4, at 222, at 68 (emphasis omitted) (insertions two through 
five in original). The passage reads as follows: 
This pleasure is . . . not practical in any way, neither like the one arising from the pathological 
basis, agreeableness, nor like the one arising from the intellectual basis, the conceived good. 
Yet it does have a causality in it, namely, to keep [us in] the state of [having] the presentation 
itself, and [to keep] the cognitive powers engaged [in their occupation] without any further 
aim. We linger in our contemplation of the beautiful, because this contemplation reinforces 
and reproduces itself. This is analogous to (though not the same as) the way in which we 
linger over something charming that, as we present an object, repeatedly arouses attention, 
[though here] the mind is passive. 
Id. (emphasis omitted) (insertions in original). 
 8. See Guyer, supra note 6, at 456. Guyer writes: 
[I]f aesthetic response naturally produces a desire for its own preservation, then it is also 
natural to think of it as leading to a desire for at least the continued existence of its object. For 
if the existence of a given object is the condition of our having a representation or experience 
of it, then that existence will be a condition of our enjoying that representation. In that case, 
the tendency to preserve one‘s state of mind—the enjoyment—will certainly extend to the 
condition of that state of mind, or the desire will extend to the existence of the object; for if it 
is analytically true that to will an end is to will the necessary means to it, then it should also 
be true that to desire an end is to desire the means to it. But a desire for the continued 
existence of an object we have found beautiful is certainly one thing we could mean by an 
interest in the beautiful; thus, the fact that our response to beauty is pleasure must itself lead 
to an interest in the continued existence of its object. 
Id. (citation and footnotes omitted). 
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Critique of Judgment—where interest is described as a ―pleasure in the 
existence of an object‖9 is not specific enough to defend Kantian 
disinterest against this apparent contradiction—Guyer instead turns to the 
account of interest offered in the Critique of Practical Reason. In this 
earlier text,  
an interest is not itself a feeling of pleasure, but rather a kind of 
concept of an object. . . . An interest in an object is only present 
when there is a concept of it, by means of which pleasure or the 
expectation of pleasure can be linked to it. . . . The disinterestedness 
of aesthetic judgment thus does not entail a total separation of 
aesthetic pleasure and desire, but only the independence of pleasure 
in beautiful objects from desires that can be attached to determinate 
general concepts.
10
 
Once the notion of interest is defined practically, that is, as having a 
necessary relation to concepts, there is no longer a direct connection 
between the self-preservative character of disinterested pleasure as 
lingering and the preserved existence of the object as the condition for that 
lingering. The connection between our investment in aesthetic pleasure 
and its necessary condition is severed because that investment is pre-
conceptual. It is only within the practical domain, where desires are 
conceptualized and taken up as reflectively endorsed (billigen or gebilligt) 
reasons for action that one can move from an investment in some object, 
state, or action to the necessary conditions for its realization. For this 
reason, Guyer uses the term ―desire‖ in order to distinguish between our 
aesthetic investments and our practical investments—that is, between our 
aesthetic ―interests‖ and interests proper. Practical desires are interests; 
they are conceptualized and reflectively endorsed. Aesthetic desires are 
―dis-interests,‖ so to speak; they are either not yet conceptualized, or are 
perhaps intrinsically unconceptualizable. As a result of this distinction, 
and by introducing the term ―desire,‖ Guyer provides us with a means with 
which we can speak about our investments in beauty, without 
contradicting the tenets of disinterestedness.  
Guyer‘s solution to the interest-disinterest problem begins to address 
the concerns of what I have been calling Nietzschean-styled criticisms 
 
 
 9. KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 4, at 296, at 163 (emphasis omitted). 
 10. Guyer, supra note 6, at 457–58. ―[W]hat pleasure in the beautiful must be separated from is 
not existence itself, but the kinds of judgments we typically make about the existence of objects. Such 
judgments, as well as any pleasures they generate, require the application of determinate concepts to 
their objects.‖ Id. at 458. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/5
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because it provides the conceptual coordinates to otherwise name 
disinterestedness. Disinterestedness is aesthetic desire. Guyer thus shows 
how we can speak about disinterested pleasure as something other than 
indifference. But while Guyer‘s overall strategy is compelling, it fails to 
address another side of the debates about Kantian disinterest: the 
separation of aesthetic desires from interests is not sufficient for 
distinguishing between aesthetic pleasures and agreeable pleasures.  
How can aesthetic desire provide an account of disinterested pleasure 
that is not reducible to sensuous pleasure or what Kant calls das 
Wohlgefallen am Angenehman, a liking for the agreeable?
11
 While Guyer‘s 
interest-desire distinction makes it clear that disinterestedness is non- 
conceptual, it does not explain how aesthetic desire is not merely 
sensuous. It therefore needs to be supplemented by an account where 
aesthetic pleasure is at once an embodied feeling of pleasure and a desire 
for that feeling, without at the same time operating according to the kind 
of causality that we find in the agreeable and which also constrains the 
freedom of the imagination. For example, when Guyer speaks of aesthetic 
desire, he employs a series of euphemisms for a non-conceptual, non-
practical investment in beauty:  
Thus, while the impossibility of formulating a certain kind of 
concept-connected interest on the basis of aesthetic judgments 
might be a consequence of Kant‘s explanation of aesthetic response, 
it does not follow that aesthetic response itself cannot produce a 
perfectly natural desire for the existence of its particular objects, nor 
that it cannot itself become the object of an equally natural—though 
certainly less determinate—desire.12 
The phrases ―perfectly natural desire‖ or ―equally natural—though 
certainly less determinate—desire‖ outline the territory of aesthetic desire, 
but they do not give us a clear picture of desire as it stands outside of the 
practical faculty, and outside of merely sensuous inclinations. If one 
accepts Guyer‘s account, it is still necessary to sketch out a broader picture 
of the relationship between aesthetic desire and disinterested pleasure. 
Thus Guyer‘s account in Disinterestedness and Desire in Kant’s 
Aesthetics is only a partial answer to the question of the ―interest‖ of 
disinterest. We are left to ask where such a notion of aesthetic desire 
 
 
 11. This phrase comes from the title of section three in KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 4, at 205, at 
47 (―A Liking for the Agreeable Is Connected with Interest [Das Wohlgefallen am Angenehman ist mit 
Interesse Verbunden]‖). 
 12. Guyer, supra note 6, at 459. 
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might stand within Kant‘s rich taxonomy of designations, which, in 
addition to interest (Interesse), includes: feeling (Gefühl), emotion 
(Rührung), affect (Affekt), inclination (Neigung), gratification 
(Vergnügen), enjoyment (Genießen), sensation (Empfindung), sensation 
proper (Sinnesempfindung), sense (Sinn), sensibility (Sinlichkeit), and so 
on and so forth.  
II 
Although it may at first appear that these terms can be easily classified 
in relation to disinterested pleasure, their usage in the third Critique in 
relation to such pleasure requires significant elaboration. To begin with, 
Kant clearly and explicitly denies that aesthetic pleasure is an intellectual 
(intellektuell) pleasure. This contrast between aesthetic and intellectual 
pleasures, however, merely restates that aesthetic desire is not an interest, 
since the term intellectual is not a general term about mindedness, but 
refers specifically to the cognitive processes in the restrictive sense of the 
term, i.e., what is conceptual. Therefore, a thing or process can be entirely 
mental without at the same time being intellectual.
13
 This distinction 
therefore does not help us to understand Kant‘s view on disinterested 
pleasure as a feeling that is at the same time intrinsically connected to 
reflective mental processes.  
On the other hand, the term sensation as it appears in the third Critique 
allows for a more productive inroad into the relation between aesthetic 
desire and disinterested pleasure. As is well known, the German 
Empfindung (along with the English term ―sensation‖) carries the 
ambiguity of the Greek aisthésthai (Aesthetic), meaning both sensation of 
the world and internal feeling.
14
 Kant notes in the published Introduction 
that the term aesthetic refers to ―[w]hat is merely subjective in the 
presentation of an object, i.e., what constitutes its reference to the subject, 
and not to the object . . . .‖15 He then distinguishes between two kinds of 
 
 
 13. See KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 4, at 218–19, at 63. The passage states: 
If the given representation, which occasions the judgment of taste, were a concept, which 
united understanding and imagination in the judging of the object into a cognition of the 
object, then the consciousness of this relationship would be intellectual (as in the objective 
schematism of the power of judgment, which was dealt with in the critique). But in that case 
the judgment would not be made in relation to pleasure and displeasure, hence it would not be 
a judgment of taste. 
Id. (translation revised). 
 14. See the editor‘s note 45, in the Pluhar edition of id. at 228 n.45, at 75. 
 15. Id. at 188, at 28. 
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sensations—two aspects of our power of receptivity—that are both 
aesthetic and subjective even though they play a fundamental role in the 
production of cognitive-objective knowledge construction. First, sensation 
has a formal aspect: space as the a priori form of intuition through which 
external objects are given to us. Kant calls space the merely subjective 
feature of sensible representations in our cognition of appearances because 
it is subjective in the sense that our a priori capacities are not grounded in 
anything external. Second, sensation refers to our being affected by the 
content of sense-data—that is, by the ―material‖ or ―real‖ ―through which 
something existing is given‖ in our ―cognition of objects outside us.‖16 
Sense-data are ―merely subjective in our presentations of things outside 
us‖ insofar as that which is received by the senses is already a matter of 
appearances rather than things-in-themselves. Sense-data are something 
received and are in this sense subjective for Kant. Both of these aspects of 
sensation are tied to cognition. However, Kant then introduces a third 
subjective kind of sensation, which will be central to disinterested 
pleasure: ―that subjective [feature] of a presentation which cannot at all 
become an element of cognition is the pleasure or displeasure connected 
with that presentation.‖17 In section three of the Analytic of the Beautiful, 
Kant will call this subjective use of sensation ―feeling‖: ―[w]e call that 
which must always remain merely subjective, and absolutely cannot 
constitute a representation of an object by the otherwise customary name 
of ‗feeling.‘‖18 Feeling no longer directly refers to anything external, since 
it is merely the awareness of one‘s own internal state. At the beginning of 
section thirty-nine, ―On the Communicability of a Sensation,‖ Kant will 
add a further distinction—Sinnesempfindung (sensation proper)—which 
reinforces the difference between feeling and the first two versions of 
subjective sensation laid out above. The form and content of externally-
directed sensation (space as the a priori form of intuition and sense-data as 
the content of external perception) are kinds of Sinnesempfindung. As 
Pluhar notes, Sinnesempfindung literally means ―sensation of sense.‖ 
Since Sinnesempfindung is concerned with receiving information from the 
external world, it is a sensation of sense impressions. On the other hand, 
―feeling is not sensation proper, precisely because it does not have its own 
 
 
 16. Id. at 188–89, at 28–29 (translation revised). Kant will use this distinction between the formal 
and the material aspects of sensation again in the beginning of section thirty-nine, ―On the 
Communicability of a Sensation.‖ Id. at 291, at 157. 
 17. Id. at 189, at 29 (insertion in original). 
 18. Id. at 206, at 48 (translation revised). 
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sense [Sinne]‖;19 feeling is a direct awareness of a state that a subject is in 
and does not have external sense-data as content. Thus, the difference 
between Gefühl and Sinnesempfindung shows that there is an objective 
and subjective side to what Kant calls ―merely‖ subjective sensation. 
Sinnesempfindung is the objective side of subjective sensation; it is 
concerned with objects in the world. Gefühl is the subjective side of 
subjective sensation; it is only concerned with states of the subject.  
Kant‘s account is further complicated by the fact that Gefühl (as the 
subjective side of subjective sensation) is also bifurcated—even though 
Kant does not fully develop this distinction in an organized manner. When 
Kant discusses the difference between the objective and subjective 
meanings of sensation in section three of the Analytic of the Beautiful he 
categorizes agreeable pleasure under Gefühl: 
The green color of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as 
perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness belongs to 
subjective sensation, through which no object is presented 
[vorgestellt wird], i.e., to feeling, through which the object is 
considered as an object of satisfaction (which is not a cognition of 
it).
20
 
Despite the fact that Kant calls the green color of the meadows ―objective 
sensation,‖ it is the same as what he referred to earlier as merely subjective 
sensation, i.e., the content side of Sinnesempfindung. The greenness is the 
objective side of merely subjective sensation because it still refers to 
something external; it has a ―sense.‖ On the other hand, the 
―agreeableness‖ (the agreeable pleasure) is described as a ―feeling.‖ Kant 
calls it ―subjective sensation,‖ and what he means by this term here is that 
 
 
 19. Id. at 291 n.19, at 157. 
 20. Id. at 206, at 48 (translation revised). The full paragraph reads: 
If a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation, then this 
expression means something entirely different than if I call the representation of a thing 
(through sense, as a receptivity belonging to the faculty of cognition) sensation. For in the 
latter case the representation is related to the object, but in the first case it is related solely to 
the subject, and does not serve for any cognition at all, not even that by which the subject 
cognizes itself. In the above explanation, however, we understand by the word ―sensation‖ an 
objective representation of the senses; and, in order not always to run the risk of being 
misinterpreted, we will call that which must always remain merely subjective and absolutely 
cannot constitute a representation of an object by the otherwise customary name of ―feeling.‖ 
The green color of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as perception of an object of 
sense; but its agreeableness belongs to subjective sensation, through which no object is 
represented, i.e., to feeling, through which the object is considered as an object of satisfaction 
(which is not a cognition of it). 
Id. at 206, at 47–48 (translation revised). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2013] AN INTEREST IN THE IMPOSSIBLE 67 
 
 
 
 
it does not have a ―sense‖; it is an immediate, non-representational 
awareness of an internal state of the subject. And since it is no longer an 
awareness of something external, it does not partake of cognition. But 
while the feeling of agreeable pleasure is similar to the account of Gefühl 
in the published Introduction discussed above, in that feeling is non-
cognitive in both accounts (i.e., not part of objective knowledge 
construction), the earlier account explicitly ties feeling to presentations. In 
the Introduction, feeling (pleasure or displeasure) is the subjective feature 
of a presentation (Vorstellung), which cannot become a part of cognition, 
but which remains ―connected‖ (verbundene) ―with that presentation.‖21 In 
this earlier account of feeling, pleasure and displeasure are the means by 
which we are able to recognize the harmony or disharmony of the 
imagination and the understanding. This harmony between the faculties is 
the way that we are able to recognize purposive form, which includes 
experiences of beauty
22
 and experiences in which we are able to order 
empirical laws of nature under higher-order empirical laws.
23
 This 
pleasure, then, is the pleasure that arises through reflective judgment, or 
what we can call ―reflective pleasure.‖ What thus distinguishes agreeable 
feeling from reflective feeling is that agreeable feeling is a passive result 
that is produced ―mechanistically‖ by something external, whereas 
reflective feeling is a result of the activity of the mind—the free play of 
the imagination in relation to the understanding. So, even though 
agreeable feeling does not have a sense, in that it is merely the sensation of 
the subject‘s state without any presentation, the production of that state 
still has its ground in something external. The greenness of the meadow is 
still the source of the feeling of agreeable pleasure (the ―satisfaction‖ 
within the subject) even if that greenness does not provide feeling with 
content. This is why agreeable pleasure can arise even without the 
employment of judgment.
24
 In contrast, reflective feeling can only arise 
through judgment. It is concerned merely with the form of an object and 
whether that form allows us to discern purposiveness, and it is not based 
on sense-data as content: ―[f]or the basis of the [reflective] pleasure is 
posited merely in the form of the object for reflection in general, and 
 
 
 21. Id. at 189, 28–29. As quoted above: ―that subjective [feature] of a presentation which cannot 
at all become an element of cognition is the pleasure or displeasure connected with that presentation.‖ 
Id. at 189, at 29 (insertion in original). 
 22. See id. at 190–91, at 30–31. 
 23. See id. at 187–88, at 27–28. 
 24. Id. at 207, at 48 (―Indeed, what is agreeable in the liveliest ways requires no judgment at all 
about the character of the object . . . .‖) 
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hence not in a sensation of the object . . . .‖25 Thus, the most significant 
form of sensation in the third Critique, namely the recognition of 
―aesthetic presentation[s] of purposiveness,‖26 is only sensation in the 
most strained manner: sensation without sense.
27
  
It should be clear then that Gefühl (as the subjective side of subjective 
sensation) thus has two completely distinct meanings. While in many ways 
the differences between these notions of feeling are clearly acknowledged 
by Kant—for instance, he is adamant that reflective feeling must be free 
and non-mechanistic—in other ways, some confusion is carried over into 
the elaboration of disinterested pleasure. I will now turn to the often-
discussed problem of the sequence of disinterested pleasure and reflective 
judgment in order to highlight how there is an unintended remainder of the 
agreeable within disinterested pleasure and the consequences of this.  
III 
In section nine of the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant outlines the 
notion of feeling as subjective sensation that is necessary for disinterested 
pleasure. Here he identifies feeling as the way that the subjective unity of 
the imagination and the understanding makes itself known to us in an 
experience of the beautiful: since such unity is non-conceptual, we can 
only have access to it through Gefühl. Disinterested pleasure registers the 
harmony between these faculties, in lieu of conceptual understanding. 
Kant says that the ―unity in the relation [between the cognitive powers] in 
the subject can only reveal itself through sensation,‖28 by which he means 
aesthetic feeling. 
The passages linking feeling with the harmony of the faculties contain 
a certain amount of ambiguity and thus raise a number of critical 
questions.
29
 On the one hand, Kant gives us a picture in which a 
representation in the mind ―acts as a stimulus‖ for reflective judgment. 
The word that is translated here as ―stimulus‖ is Anlasse—which also has 
the sense of an event or occasion. In this case, the term Kant employs 
 
 
 25. Id. at 190, at 30. 
 26. Id. at 189, at 29. 
 27. As Kant puts it: ―Wenn eine Bestimmung des Gefühls der Lust oder Unlust Empfindung 
genannt wird,‖ which translates to, ―[w]hen a dtermination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is 
called a sensation, this term means something quite different than sensation as ‗the presentation 
[Vorstellung] of a thing (through the senses, a receptivity which belongs to the cognitive power).‖ Id. 
at 206, at 47 (translation revised). 
 28. Id. at 219, at 63 (insertion in original). 
 29. See id. 
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suggests that a presentation (Vorstellung) is an opportunity for reflective 
activity, and not simply a cause of that activity. Should the presentation be 
the right kind for beauty, the imagination and understanding come to stand 
in a relation of harmony. We can have access to this result, (the state of 
harmony), only through the feeling of pleasure. According to this reading, 
disinterested pleasure is merely the result of another process—the 
harmony arrived at in the free play of the faculties. The feeling of 
disinterested pleasure would therefore function as a kind of signal. This 
would indeed suggest that the significance of aesthetic pleasure is distinct 
from the significance of sensuous and moral pleasure, since disinterested 
pleasure would not be the result of an unfree, mechanistic process. But 
since feeling played no part in the activity of reflection, feeling itself 
would be something intrinsically passive.  
On the other hand, the passage lends itself to another reading in which 
the harmony of the faculties would bear a deeper relation to the feeling of 
pleasure than that of cause and effect. In this case, feeling would be more 
directly connected to the process of mental activity as reflection. When 
Kant explains that the only possible consciousness of the harmony 
between the faculties is feeling, he says that ―no other consciousness of 
[the relation of harmony] is possible except through sensation of the effect 
[durch Empfindung der Wirkung] . . . .‖30 Kant then says that this 
―sensation of the effect‖ directly ―consists in the facilitated play of both 
powers of the mind (imagination and understanding), enlivened through 
mutual agreement.‖31 If we read the phrase ―sensation of the effect,‖ such 
that the effect is the harmony of the faculties when confronted with an 
occasion for beauty, and the sensation is our feeling or consciousness of 
that effect, then we end up with an account in which feeling is merely a 
signal—as above. In this case, the effect (i.e., the harmony) would directly 
consist in the play of the faculties and the mutual enlivenment. However, 
it can also be read in another manner such that it is the sensation (of the 
effect) that directly consists in that play and mutual agreement. According 
to this reading, the sensation (i.e., the aesthetic feeling) would not merely 
be an awareness of the harmonic agreement of the faculties; it would 
constitute that agreement. To put it more directly, the feeling would not be 
a signal of some underlying state (a state of harmonic relation between the 
faculties). The feeling of pleasure would directly be a certain kind of 
internal relation: harmony. Aesthetic pleasure would be constituted by the 
 
 
 30. Id. (translation revised). 
 31. Id. (translation revised). 
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internal relation of harmony rather than being a mere representative of that 
state of harmony.  
Of course, this reading is in tension with certain passages in which 
Kant does seem to imply that feeling is merely an awareness of harmony. 
However, it is my intention to show that this issue is an unresolved 
tension, even in those passages in which Kant seems to be maintaining a 
separation between feeling and harmonic relation. For example, in the 
passage that has been under discussion, the contrast between objective 
relation and the subjective conditions of that objective relation at first 
appears to position feeling as the mere consciousness of an underlying 
relation: 
An objective relation can only be thought. Still, insofar as it has 
subjective conditions, it can nevertheless be sensed in the effect it 
has on the mind; and if the relation is not based on a concept . . . 
then the only way we can become conscious of it is through 
sensation of [the] effect [durch Empfindung der Wirkung] . . . .
32
 
A comparison is being made here between the way that we can become 
aware of an objective relation and the way that we can become aware of 
the subjective conditions of an objective relation. In the former case, we 
become aware through thinking, by which Kant means conceptual 
cognition. In the later, we become aware through feeling. However, as we 
know, Kant‘s conception of the objective cognition of appearances is 
mind-dependant. The essence of the Copernican turn is that the mind 
determines nature qua appearances, which is to say, there is not merely 
some objective relation to be recognized prior to the activity of the mind. 
In this sense, to think an objective relation is not merely to recognize that 
relation; the concept that has its source in the mind is the very relation (the 
synthesis) itself, along with the awareness of something as synthesized. To 
think an objective relation is not just to be aware of something pre-
existing; it is to constitute that relation through synthetic activity. Read in 
this way, it would make sense to claim that (1) a non-conceptual relation is 
also constituted by the activity of the mind (which Kant clearly agrees 
with this in his conception of reflective judgment), and (2) that the feeling 
is not merely the awareness of a unity; it is that unity itself. Aesthetic 
feeling, as the subjective conditions of an objective relation, is not just 
consciousness of a relation under conditions where concepts are not (yet) 
 
 
 32. Id. at 219, at 63. Pluhar translates the end of this last part of the quote above as ―sensation of 
this relation‘s effect,‖ but this is already an interpretation of the passage, in an attempt to clarify the 
meaning. In fact, Kant only says ―sensation of the effect.‖ Id.  
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applied; reflective feeling is both the relation itself and the consciousness 
of it.  
The overall point of reading this passage in this perhaps counter-
intuitive manner is that it implies that Kant is using the harmony of the 
faculties and the feeling of pleasure interchangeably. From this, it would 
follow that the feeling of pleasure is not merely a subsequent signal, after 
harmony occurs, but that harmony and feeling are somehow intrinsically 
related and simultaneous. What is at stake in this interpretation is not just 
whether the cause of aesthetic pleasure (reflective play) is free or unfree—
it is clear from Kant‘s conception of aesthetic reflective judgment that it is 
free—but whether there is something intrinsic to aesthetic pleasure itself 
that participates in the free play of judgment.  
The problem with the first reading above in which harmony and 
pleasure are separable, and pleasure functions as a mere signal, is that 
pleasure is positioned as a result. But, as long as pleasure is conceived as a 
consequence of another process, it can always function as an intentional 
aim. In this case, it is difficult to see how aesthetic feeling could bear the 
structure of aesthetic desire without falling back into the logic of sensuous 
interest. Pleasure as a signal is too similar to gratification in the agreeable, 
since once it stands outside the activity of reflection itself, it can function 
as the aim of reflection. And this would constrain the purity or 
unobstructed freedom of aesthetic reflection, and risk the collapse of 
aesthetic desire into sensuous interest. This would be the unintended 
remainder of the agreeable within disinterested pleasure that I gestured at 
earlier. As long as aesthetic pleasure is treated as something subsequent to 
harmony, there is nothing radical about Kant‘s theory of aesthetic feeling. 
The significance of aesthetic feeling would be limited to the manner in 
which it is produced, in distinction from moral and sensuous interests.  
However, if pleasure and harmony are treated as being interchangeable, 
as in the second interpretation of the passage, then Kant can be understood 
to be introducing a new kind of feeling that is not the kind of ―brute 
sensations‖ that arises in agreeable pleasure. This introduction would be in 
line with Rachel Zuckert‘s claim that aesthetic feelings cannot be 
―primitive mental state[s]‖ because they possess a complex intentional 
structure.
33
 They are complex in that they are certain kinds of constitutive 
forms or relations, such as unity, disunity, and diversity—even if they are 
non-discursive and non-conceptual.  
 
 
 33. Rachel Zuckert, A New Look at Kant’s Theory of Pleasure, 60 J. AESTHETICS & ART 
CRITICISM 239, 240 (2002). 
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This view can be further supported through the connection between the 
feeling of pleasure and purposiveness that Kant draws in the published 
Introduction. Whereas Kant uses the feeling of disinterested pleasure and 
the harmony of the faculties almost interchangeability in the passages 
discussed above (in my interpretation), here he identifies feeling with 
purposiveness. In this passage, purposiveness and feeling are defined in 
identical terms as ―the subjective aspect in a representation which cannot 
become an element of cognition at all . . . .‖
34
 He also says that, ―[t]he 
object is . . . called purposive . . . only because its representation is 
immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure.‖35 While Kant is not 
yet talking about aesthetic feeling, but transcendental feeling in general, 
this ―immediate connection‖ between purposiveness and feeling suggests 
that the feeling of pleasure is not subsequent to the recognition of 
purposiveness, or a mere signal of it. And if pleasure operates in this way 
for all reflective judgments, then it should also hold in the case of aesthetic 
reflective judgments. Moreover, transcendental feeling is meant to bridge 
the gap between practical and theoretical legislation—something that 
cannot be achieved by cognition in the strict sense. In this capacity, feeling 
certainly seems to be claim-bearing and complex such that aesthetic 
pleasure is not an effect of judging, but somehow intrinsically relates to 
reflecting and judging. 
It seems necessary to maintain this view of the complexity of 
disinterested pleasure if it is to play the role that Kant assigns to it. This is 
because aesthetic feeling is something that is actually felt—and not merely 
a euphemism for intellectual delight, as Kant makes clear—while at the 
 
 
 34. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT 189, at 75 (Paul Guyer ed., Paul 
Guyer & Eric Matthews trans., 2001) (emphasis omitted). Kant states: 
However, the subjective aspect in a representation which cannot become an element of 
cognition at all is the pleasure or displeasure connected with it . . . . [T]he purposiveness that 
precedes the cognition of an object, which is immediately connected with it even without 
wanting to use the representation of it for a cognition, is the subjective aspect of it that cannot 
become an element of cognition at all. The object is therefore called purposive in this case 
only because its representation is immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure; and this 
representation itself is an aesthetic representation of the purposiveness. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). It is clear that a number of the claims made here conflict with claims that Kant 
will later make, notably, the order of the judgment and the pleasure. There is also the question of 
whether or not there is a special or even founding relationship between the principle of purposiveness 
and aesthetic reflective judgment, as opposed to reflective judgment in general. Rachel Zuckert, for 
instance, will claim that there is such a special relationship between purposiveness and aesthetic 
judgment. See Zuckert, supra note 33, at 245. My point, in using this quote, is not to take an ultimate 
position on those issues, but merely to show the deep relationship between feeling and the recognition 
of purposiveness.  
 35. KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 4, at 190, at 30 (translation revised). 
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same time it is tied to subjective universality. If it is only the source (either 
free play or constraint by rules) that allows us to differentiate between the 
sensations of agreeable gratification and disinterested pleasure, then it is 
difficult to see how aesthetic feeling relates to the reflective play of the 
imagination without defiling the purity of the aesthetic judgment. If Kant‘s 
account of disinterested pleasure is to explain our unique kind of 
investment in beauty (what I have been calling aesthetic desire), the 
pleasure itself, and not only its source (i.e., the process of reflection) must 
be distinct from agreeable and moral pleasure. Or, to put it more precisely, 
pleasure and process are no longer so clearly distinguishable. In distinction 
from passive forms of pleasure—aesthetic feeling must bear a more direct 
connection to intuition and reflection.  
In my view, Kant is grappling with the thought that there is a kind of 
pleasure that is not merely a conditioned bodily response, nor a mere 
mental abstraction, but one that intrinsically relates embodied feeling and 
the process of mental reflection. The reason, in my view, that Kant is 
conflicted about giving full weight to the idea that feeling and relation are 
unified, is that the term ―feeling‖ has had an historic connection to merely 
individual sensations, emotions for example. Emotions, however, are 
usually taken to be utterly individual and in this respect cannot provide a 
ground for the subjective universality of taste. However, Kant‘s theory of 
reflective feeling is clearly radically distinct from this. Kant‘s hesitation is 
a consequence of not fully committing to the radicality of the notion of 
feeling that he has already proposed. Reflective feeling, as a connection 
between bodily states and mental processes, introduces a new intermediate 
territory that Kant‘s prior conceptual categories struggle to contend with. 
One passage that is particularly expressive of this struggle can be found in 
section five of the Analytic of the Beautiful.
36
 There Kant says: 
Agreeableness holds for nonrational animals [vernunftlose Thiere] 
too; beauty only for human beings, i.e., beings who are animal and 
yet rational, though it is not enough that they be rational (e.g., 
spirits) but they must be animal as well; the good, however, holds 
for every rational being as such . . . .
37
  
 
 
 36. Id. at 216–17, at 61. 
 37. Id. at 210, at 52. The German reads as follows: 
Annehmlichkeit gilt auch für vernunftlose Thiere; Schönheit nur für Menschen, d.i. thierische, 
aber doch vernünftige Wesen, aber auch nicht blos als solche (z.B. Geister), sondern zugleich 
als thierische; das Gute aber für jedes vernünftige Wesen überhaupt; ein Satz, der nur in der 
Folge seine vollständige Rechtfertigung und Erklärung bekommen kann. 
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The three kinds of pleasures (the agreeable, the beautiful, and the good) 
and the three kinds of beings (animals, humans, and purely rational 
beings) can be aligned with the three kinds of interests: sensuous interests, 
disinterest, and practical interests. A purely rational creature would not be 
able to experience beauty, since it would be fully invested in practical 
interests, leaving no room for aesthetic desire. The non-rational animal 
also cannot experience beauty since pleasure in ―the agreeable [is] a liking 
that is conditioned pathologically by stimuli (stimuli) . . . .‖38 But if neither 
of these kinds of beings can experience beauty, it is curious that Kant 
claims that human beings must be a combination of these features in order 
to be the kind of being capable of experiencing beauty. Or put otherwise, it 
is difficult to see how the mere aggregation of two sources of interests—
rational pleasure and sensuous pleasure—could account for the appearance 
of disinterested pleasure.  
Why then does Kant claim that we must be part animal in order to 
experience beauty, if animal pleasure is pathologically conditioned? When 
Kant makes this claim I take him to mean that certain aspects of human 
experience that are ordinarily associated with embodied heteronomy—
feeling, sensation, and sensuous desires—need not be fully conditioned, as 
they are for animals. Human animality is thus distinct from animal 
animality. Our capacity for rational reflection not only allows us to act 
freely, rather than be controlled by natural desires; it allows us to 
transform those desires. That is to say, our capacity for thinking 
denaturalizes our feelings, sensations, and inclinations so that they are 
intrinsically plastic, and open onto our freedom (we might call this distinct 
kind of animality the ―huminal‖). It is because our desire is denaturalized, 
by our having reason, that even our feelings and sensations are 
intrinsically complex and no longer reducible to primitive bodily states. 
And it is because of this that aesthetic desire and aesthetic feeling can be 
non-conditioned modes of sensation that occupy an intermediary territory 
between animal inclinations and purely rational interests. It is because 
human animality is distinct from animal animality that Kant can use 
transcendental feeling interchangeably with purposiveness and aesthetic 
feeling interchangeably with the harmony of the faculties.  
 
 
 38. Id. at 209, at 51. 
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IV 
In order to clarify this view of the intricate connection between 
thinking and embodied feeling, I will now turn to a long footnote in the 
published Introduction where Kant speaks about affects in the context of 
wishing and desiring. First he says: 
I have been reproached . . . for defining the power of desire as the 
power of being the cause, through one's presentations, of the 
actuality of the objects of these presentations. This criticism was 
that, after all, mere wishes are desires too [bloße Wünsche doch 
auch Begehrungen wären], and yet we all know that they alone do 
not enable us to produce their object. That, however, proves nothing 
more than that some of man's desires involve him in self-
contradiction [mit sich selbst im Widerspruche steht], inasmuch as 
he uses the presentation by itself to strive to produce the object, 
while he cannot expect success from it. Such is the case because he 
is aware that his mechanical forces . . . which would have to be 
determined by that presentation in order to bring the object 
about . . . are either insufficient, or perhaps even directed to 
something impossible [etwas Unmögliches], such as to undo what is 
done . . . , or as being able, as one is waiting impatiently for some 
wished-for moment, to destroy what time remains.
39
 
Kant is making the point that wishing—as opposed to practical desires or 
interests—is a state of self-contradiction, because it tries to produce a 
result in the world merely through a presentation in one's mind. Since 
wishing does not actualize an object or aim in the world, it wills the end 
without willing the means. On the other hand, practical desire for Kant is 
non-contradictory because it is analytically true that having a practical 
desire (i.e., an interest) entails our activity of actualizing that desire. For 
something to be a practical interest it must be conceptualizable, and 
capable of being something real, which is to say, it must obey the laws of 
non-contradiction. If we take wishing as a model for aesthetic desire, then 
practical interest is excluded from aesthetic pleasure because we can only 
take an interest in the existence of an object if that ―object‖ is conceptually 
coherent. To be an object of aesthetic desire, on the other hand, is to be an 
object of wish—an impossible object, an object with contradictory 
 
 
 39. Id. at 177–78 n.18, at 16–17. An earlier version of this footnote can be found in the First 
Introduction at 230‘–31‘ n.50, at 421–22. 
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predicates, for example. The object, which is the occasion of aesthetic 
pleasure, is very much like a wish that can only be realized within 
aesthetic form.
40
 In this sense, beauty is the impossible made possible.  
The idea of aesthetic desire as a mode of wishing can be further 
supported when Kant goes on to connect wishing with affects in the same 
footnote: 
In such fanciful desires [phantastischen Begehrungen] [as 
destroying time] we are indeed aware that our presentations are 
insufficient (or even unfit) to be the cause of their objects. Still their 
causal relation, and hence the thought of their causality, is 
contained in every wish and is especially noticeable . . . when that 
wish is an affect [Affect], namely, longing [Sehnsucht].
41
 
Longing as it appears here is an impossible wish because it wants what 
cannot be achieved by any action whatsoever. Implicit in this description 
of longing is that an affect is not a brute sensation. It can be composed of 
two fully discursive propositional thoughts that contradict one another, 
both of which are structured through relations of causality. The first 
thought is the fanciful desire to be able to control time merely through 
one‘s will. The second thought is that time is not subject to the will. 
Affect, in this case, is a kind of feeling that holds together in a unity two 
contradictory thoughts; or, we might say, affect is the synthesis of what 
cannot be unified within the understanding or at the conceptual level, 
because it disregards the law of non-contradiction. Affect is thus a non-
cognitive synthesis where a feeling arises instead of a concept—and this 
feeling is the consciousness of a particular kind of relation. In this 
example, the feeling of longing is a sensation (a form of conscious 
awareness) that expresses a state of contradiction between two 
contradictory propositions. This entails that while the feeling is non-
cognitive in the strict sense, its components can be discursive even if they 
are not consciously available, and the relation between elements can be 
discursively translated. Affects are capable of embodying relations of 
form. They are felt-forms. The logic of affect sheds light on one of the 
central features of aesthetic form—that feeling is directly tied to the 
capacity to grant non-conceptual unity to what is heterogeneous. Affects 
make emphatic that aesthetic feeling is not mere sensation (in the sense of 
an awareness that lacks intrinsic complexity).  
 
 
 40. This is part of the reason why works of art occupy a singular space that ordinary objects 
cannot, even beyond the frame of beauty. 
 41. KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 4, at 178 n.18, at 17. 
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Kant‘s example describes an intermediary space where feeling and 
meaning already coincide, and in this respect, affect offers an in-road into 
the domain of human ―animality,‖ or more precisely, feeling that is not 
pathologically conditioned. Affect designates that our feelings are 
complex and contend with structures of logical ambivalence. This is not 
only relevant to the content of particular aesthetic judgments. This kind of 
logical ambivalence also applies to Kant‘s descriptions of aesthetic form 
itself: disinterested pleasure as interest without interest; purposiveness 
without purpose as lawfulness without law; and, subjective universality as 
unity without conceptual unity. This is in addition to the fact that—as 
Rudolf Makkreel has pointed out in his Imagination and Interpretation in 
Kant—Kant brings together two apparently conflicting affective stances in 
our experience of the beautiful: restful contemplation and vital 
enlivenment.
42
 Kant‘s general dismissal of affects throughout the third 
Critique, as being too interested and psychological for playing any role in 
aesthetic judging, should be read in light of the need for a more robust 
account of aesthetic feeling than Kant provides; transcendental feeling 
requires a transcendental account of affect.  
In claiming that affect helps us to get at human animality, as an account 
of feeling that is not pathologically conditioned, I have been suggesting 
that between the non-rational animal and the purely rational being (that is 
only practical), stands another kind of logic—what we might call the 
irrational, or the more than rational. In this formulation, rationality would 
be constructed out of the irrational, through the barring of certain kinds of 
connections that the mind is capable of, but which are logically 
contradictory. To be clear, I am not suggesting that human beings lack 
reason, or that they are non-sensical, but that affect takes up elements of 
the rational and arranges them in configurations that would be strictly 
impossible from the perspective of the conceptual. And this is also true of 
the imagination in its free play in Kant‘s account of aesthetic judgment—
so that a connection is drawn between the process of reflection and the 
structure that is operative within affect. This notion of the irrational as an 
expression of non-conceptual arrangement also allows us, in connection 
with wishing and affect as a model of aesthetic desire, to further 
distinguish aesthetic pleasure from pathological and practical pleasures. In 
section six of the published Introduction, Kant describes pleasure in terms 
of the satisfaction of an aim, and this description is meant to apply to 
 
 
 42. RUDOLF A. MAKKREEL, IMAGINATION AND INTERPRETATION IN KANT: THE 
HERMENEUTICAL IMPORT OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 95–96 (1990). 
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sensuous pleasure, practical pleasure, and transcendental pleasure, insofar 
as it relates to the purposiveness of nature in our systemization of the 
empirical laws of nature. For aesthetic purposiveness-without-purpose, 
this account of aim satisfaction is at odds with the contingency of the 
judgment of taste, whose end-point cannot be imposed prior to the 
judgment itself. It was for this reason that I have also argued that pleasure 
should not be seen as a signal of a prior process of judgment. In this case, 
the logic of aim and its satisfaction seems to miss what is essential about 
disinterested aesthetic pleasure. The notion of affect as both a relation 
between elements and the consciousness of that relation through feeling 
helps to clarify how and in what way disinterested pleasure is too complex 
to fall within a linear model of the satisfaction of an aim. Following the 
account of logical ambivalence provided through affect, aesthetic pleasure 
can instead be seen as, at once, satisfaction and non-satisfaction. Aesthetic 
pleasure does not follow a structure of desire and lack, but overcomes this 
difference by unifying them into a single complex affective state of 
feeling: a pleasure in desiring itself. Our aesthetic desire notivates us to 
seek out aesthetic unities (purposive form without purpose); the activity of 
our mind constitutes and sustains the unity of that form; and this in turn 
sustains our aesthetic desire. We linger in the beautiful because of this 
reciprocally sustaining organization of desire, pleasure, and form. This 
kind of non-linear order bears some similarity to the logic of an organism, 
though deprived of the notion of purpose or function. What we experience 
in beauty is not the possession of an aim or an object, but a state of 
tension. Our lingering in the beautiful is that state of suspension between 
the activity of desiring the aesthetic form, and the activity of sustaining the 
unity of that form through the imagination. This is why the aesthetic 
pleasure is not a kind of aim-satisfaction, and why aesthetic pleasure 
reinforces and reproduces itself. By not achieving the aim (that is by not 
closing the circuit of desire and its ―object‖), the relation between 
elements is sustained, and the feeling of pleasure continues. The 
―satisfaction‖ of aesthetic pleasure is in this tension itself. 
In understanding aesthetic pleasure as an affect, and an affect as a kind 
of relation, a connection is drawn between aesthetic pleasure and the 
structure of aesthetic unity as purposiveness-without-purpose. 
Purposiveness-without-purpose as the kind of order operative in the 
beautiful separates out from our notion of life what is pathologically 
conditioned and what is purely spontaneous. ―Without purpose‖ excludes 
those aspects of animal life, such as mere self-preservation, that are 
functions over and above self-animation. Purposiveness-without-purpose 
thus refines life down to the impulse of spontaneity, which stands outside 
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the logic of mechanism or rational purpose. The self-reproducing character 
of aesthetic pleasure as lingering—as a state of pleasurable tension in the 
mutual dependance of desire and form—is the reproduction of the 
structure of life‘s animation, at the level of imagination and pleasure. The 
feeling of enlivenment that accompanies aesthetic pleasure, in Kant‘s 
account, is therefore attributable to this achievement of actively recreating, 
in another form, the self-animation that life is, aside from the functions of 
an organic body. As living creatures, spontaneity is not a product of our 
free activity; it is a condition of any freedom. In the experience of 
aesthetic pleasure, at the level of a wish, we reproduce self-animation 
through the structure of aesthetic desire and its pleasure. It is as if we 
make our aliveness a product of our own free activity, thus enfolding our 
aliveness as an unfree condition, back into our freedom. In the free play of 
aesthetic reflection, we incorporate into our activity the only remainder 
that conditions that free play—the source of our spontaneity. For a 
moment, it is as if our aliveness were nothing more than the spontaneity of 
the imagination—as if through a wish, we could finally become the pure 
cause of our own activity. Freedom and life stand together in aesthetic 
form, in wishful contradiction. In our appreciation of aesthetic form, as 
purposiveness-without-purpose, we experience this excessive dimension 
of human life, which is no longer animal. The exuberance of form that 
characterizes our experience of the beautiful is the way that the excess of 
human life—that is, human animality—is aesthetically inscribed.  
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